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One of the more interesting phenomena of recent years has been a 
resurgence in nationalism. Brexit is a manifestation of this: the belief 
that decisions should, as a matter of principle, be taken at the level of 
the nation-state. 
Scottish nationalism, which looks set to deliver an independent 
Scotland and, as a consequence, the break-up of the UK, is another 
manifestation of this, albeit at a very different level. In this case, it is 
not Brussels but Westminster that is the external target. 
Once again, the fundamental principle is that decisions that affect 
Scots should be made in Scotland. Catalonian nationalism and 
movements for regional secession in parts of Italy are of course 
further examples of the same thing. Bavaria also exhibits extremely 
strong identity (although the politics is quite different and there 
appears little appetite for any form of secession). 
Many of the governments around the world that have been labelled 
“populist” are more truthfully “nationalist” in character. The Hungarian 
and Polish governments are good examples of this. Very often, 
nationalism comes with a dose of anti-immigrant sentiment (or at least 
opposition to the “wrong kind” of immigrant) and an appeal to 
“traditional” social values. Certainly we see this in Hungary and 
elsewhere in Europe[1]. 
The same phenomenon is true (albeit to a lesser extent, if polling 
evidence is to be believed) in the UK. Certainly, a desire to curb 
immigration was a prominent part of the campaign to leave the EU. 
Although this was predominantly painted as a question of pressure on 
public services[2], talk of Turkey joining the EU and “millions” of Turks 
moving to the UK (however false) could have come straight out of the 
far-right playbook anywhere on the continent. 
However, nationalism is not always accompanied by hostility to 
immigration. It doesn’t appear true in the Scottish case or in 
Catalonia[3]. Nevertheless, the nature of nationalism means that it is 
necessarily defined against an “other”: after all, in order to have an “in 
group”, there must be an “out group”. 
In the Scottish and Catalan cases, this is pretty clearly the English 
and Spanish respectively. In the case of Brexit (at least insofar as the 
English portion of the vote is concerned), it is clear that continental 
Europeans are the “other” against which “we” are juxtaposed. 
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Yet what determines which “in group” we belong to? The answer 
typically lies in some vague notion of “shared history” (often as much 
mythical as real) and common culture. Language is an important 
factor but hardly the only one. After all, the Swiss lack a common 
language and the US and UK are divided by one! 
Moreover, the “in group” can change over time. English, Welsh and 
Scottish have increasingly supplanted British as identities. The 
German identity didn’t really exist in any modern sense prior to 1871. 
What about Cornish (an important national identity for a surprisingly 
large subset of people living in Cornwall, according to the census[4])? 
Such identities can exist along other vectors than the national. I know 
from personal experience that in some of the territories of the former 
Ottoman Empire, religion is a stronger marker of identity than national 
affiliation. Sometimes the two coexist (often unhappily). Iran is 
perceived as a Shi’a state (in contrast to its Sunni counterparts in the 
Gulf), yet its distinctive identity also springs from differences of 
language and a past at the centre of multiple empires. 
None of this is entirely healthy in my view. Drawing lines around 
ourselves – who is “in” and who is “out” is profoundly unhelpful. Covid 
has shown us to be prisoners of this manner of thinking. 
We are all equally human: we are all susceptible to this disease. 
Nationality does not confer immunity, yet our approach to tackling it is 
mired in the politics of national identity. If we are to successfully deal 
with this disease then it is imperative that we do so together and we 
see this in the current ugly spats over vaccine allocation. 
The same is true of the many other – perhaps existential – threats that 
humanity faces. Climate change, environmental degradation, future 
pandemics (which could be far more deadly than this one) and the 
ever-growing challenge of anti-biotic resistance all require concerted 
global action. 
There are lessons here for a post-Brexit Britain, whether as one 
nation or as several. There’s a clear need for further cooperation with 
both the EU and further afield. If Britain is to craft a role for itself in a 
post-Brexit world it must be as a bridge. 
That means close, cordial, relationships with our nearest neighbours. 
It also means a focus on reducing trade barriers – including our own. 
Finally, we need to recognise the importance of openness to people. 
We should welcome those who have a contribution to make – and 
those who perhaps arrive with potential, either as students or 
otherwise – with open arms. Only then will we truly be able to facilitate 
those global links that remain so crucial for all of us. 
 
[1] The conflation of preserving national identity with a reduction in 
immigration is striking: the AfD in Germany, the FN in France, Lega in 
Italy, True Finns (since rebranded), Sweden Democrats, the Dutch 
PVV and FvD as well as large segments of the Republican Party in 
the USA. 
[2] Interestingly, although EU migration as a whole has been a net 
positive to the exchequer, issues of resource allocation in public 
expenditure (as well as the steady shrinking of large parts of the state 
under the guise of “austerity”) meant that for certain communities 
changes in population composition might well have put pressure on 
certain services, notably schools. 
[3] The Swedish case is complex but significant portions of the 
Swedish population appear to exhibit nationalist tendencies alongside 





These issues were also discussed yesterday at the Centre for Brexit 
Studies latest online event ‘State of the Union: The End of the UK?’. 
The event was hosted by Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director at the 
Centre for Brexit Studies, with contributions from four industry experts, 
Professor Katy Hayward, Jay Rowe, Professor Richard Wyn Jones 
and Professor Michael Danson. The footage from the event is now 
available to watch here. 
 
